American General Jurisdiction Trial Courts:  New Visions, New Guidelines by Parness, Jeffrey A.
PARNESS FINAL.DOC 1/12/2007 2:58:09 PM 
 
189 
American General Jurisdiction Trial Courts: New 
Visions, New Guidelines 
Jeffrey A. Parness* 
Having abandoned the exclusive focus on adjudication to embrace the 
whole dispute process, the courts have launched themselves on a 
voyage over seas that can be charted only with instruments still to be 
fashioned.1 
The most firmly implanted myth of procedural reform may be that we 
can talk usefully about it as simply an effort to increase judicial 
efficiency, without talking about our visions of procedural and social 
justice.2 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A new age in civil litigation has dawned for American trial courts of 
general jurisdiction.  The traditional role involving neutral, detached, and 
passive judges, who look to adversaries in private-party civil actions to 
prepare cases for later courtroom trials on pleaded claims, has given way 
to proactive judges who direct disputes toward resolution, increasingly 
through court-mandated hearings beyond their own courtrooms and 
judicially managed settlements.  As a result, new written guidelines have 
appeared for federal and state trial judges who now more frequently 
oversee extrajudicial (but court-sponsored) settlement discussions, who 
preside over judicial settlement conferences, and who help facilitate 
private settlement talks.  Today, written laws on trial increasingly coexist 
with written laws on settlement.  New written norms on extrajudicial 
hearings have emerged that address court-compelled and court-assisted 
mediations and arbitrations, as well as on aspects of judicial settlement 
conferences including compelled participation, contract formation, and 
                                                     
 *   Professor of Law, Northern Illinois University College of Law.  Visiting Professor, 
Washington and Lee University School of Law, 2006-2007.  B.A., Colby College; J.D., The 
University of Chicago Law School.  Thanks to Josh Smith for his excellent research assistance. 
 1. Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, “Most Cases Settle”: Judicial Promotion and Regulation of 
Settlements, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1339, 1391 (1994). 
 2. John Leubsdorf, The Myth of Civil Procedure Reform, in CIVIL JUSTICE IN CRISIS: 
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 53, 67 (Adrian A.S. Zuckerman ed., Oxford 
Univ. Press 1999). 
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contract enforcement.  Some new guidelines have also emerged on the 
judicial oversight of aspects of wholly private settlement talks, including 
insurance adjuster conduct and settlement enforcement. 
These new guidelines on civil case settlements have arisen in civil 
procedure rules, professional responsibility standards (for attorneys and 
for judges), and occasionally in substantive statutory laws.  In the 
absence of written norms, inherent judicial-power principles sometimes 
are employed.  However, the elusive nature of inherent power has caused 
much confusion, leading to doubt and unevenness where certainty and 
uniformity are desired and achievable.  Inherent power is less necessary, 
of course, where written laws operate.  And certainly, uniformity and 
certainty are promoted by explicit written laws.  The new civil litigation 
age has not, however, ushered in adequate new written laws on judicial 
settlement conferences.  Civil litigation laws anticipating trials between 
named parties on pleaded claims continue to dominate, though proactive 
trial judges increasingly facilitate settlements involving nonparties and 
unpleaded claims.  So, contemporary laws now reflect more “legend” 
and less “reality.”3 
Similarly, though to a lesser extent than for settlement, today there 
are inadequate written norms for trial court review of private arbitrations 
and agency adjudications.  For the former, there are vexing issues on the 
lines dividing trial judge and arbitrator responsibilities.  For the latter, 
there are challenging issues on the level of judicial deference to agency 
interpretation of statutes the agency administers, as well as on the scope 
of judicial review of agency factfinding. 
There is today a need for additional written guidelines on alternative 
nonevidentiary and evidentiary hearings designed to prompt settlements 
as well as on judicial and private settlement conferences.  Similarly, 
there is a need for new guidelines on trial court review of private 
arbitrations and administrative agency adjudications.4  The adoption of 
such standards would be greatly facilitated if the American Bar 
Association (ABA) were to revise the general description of the trial 
judge’s role in civil litigation, set forth in materials such as the Model 
Code of Judicial Conduct and the Standards Relating to Trial Courts.  
                                                     
 3. See Peter L. Murray, The Disappearing Massachusetts Civil Jury Trial, 89 MASS. L. REV. 
51, 60 (2004) (explaining that statistics show lawyers and judges are experiencing a different legal 
culture than that of fifty years ago). 
 4. See, e.g., Richard L. Marcus, Reform Through Rulemaking?, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 901, 903 
(2002) (“Modest reform is possible, and . . . inability to deliver revolutionary change may not be a 
bad thing.”); Laurens Walker, The Other Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 25 REV. LITIG. 79, 80 
(2006) (explaining that there is a “rich context of common law procedural rules,” the “Other Rules,” 
that function in conjunction with written rules). 
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The descriptions of American trial judges and courts, and the lawyers 
and others working with them, too often exclude significant avenues of 
civil case resolution and significant review responsibilities of trial court 
judges.  If general visions of American trial courts are limited, written 
laws on these same trial courts might address only those matters 
envisioned rather than all matters of import.  New written guidelines on 
civil case settlement and court review of private arbitrations and agency 
adjudications would be easier to implement if, for example, current 
efforts to rewrite the Model Code of Judicial Conduct encompassed a 
broader and more accurate vision of trial court responsibilities. 
The traditional role of general jurisdiction trial courts in civil 
litigation will first be explored.  In particular, the articulated visions of 
the Model Code of Judicial Conduct and the Standards Relating to Trial 
Courts, as well as the 1938 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP), 
will be examined.  Next, the new trial court role will be described, where 
there is an expectation of fewer trials, more judicially managed 
settlements, and more appellate review of civil claim resolutions initially 
made elsewhere.  Finally, some possible new guidelines on civil case 
settlement and on trial court review responsibilities will be posited, 
following an illustration of the unfortunate consequences that flow from 
a lack of general and particular codified norms. 
II. THE VISIONS OF GENERAL JURISDICTION TRIAL COURTS IN CIVIL 
LITIGATION 
In exploring the challenges facing trial judges in the vastly 
expanding arena of public-law litigation, Professor Abram Chayes nicely 
described the judicial role in “our traditional conception” of private-law 
litigation.5  Customarily, on the civil side, “a lawsuit is a vehicle for 
settling disputes between private parties about private rights.”6  The 
defining features of traditional civil litigation of private disputes are: 
 
 1. “The lawsuit is bipolar,” involving a contest between two 
adverse parties “diametrically opposed” wherein any 
decision would be “on a winner-takes-all basis.”7 
 
                                                     
 5. Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 
1282 (1976). 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
PARNESS FINAL.DOC 1/12/2007  2:58:09 PM 
192 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55 
 2. Private civil litigation is “retrospective” in that it concerns 
“an identified set of completed events.”8 
 
 3. “Right and remedy are interdependent,” so that any relief 
afforded is “derived more or less logically from the 
substantive violation” that prompted the lawsuit.9 
 
 4. A private-rights lawsuit is “a self-contained episode” so that 
the impact of any judgment “is confined to the parties” and 
normally “the judgment ends the court’s involvement.”10 
 
 5. The civil-litigation process employed to resolve a private 
dispute is “party-initiated and party-controlled” so that the 
trial judge is “a neutral arbiter of [party] interactions who 
decides questions of law only if they are put in issue.”11 
 
This perspective continues to dominate many judicial-conduct and 
trial-court standards guiding civil cases.12  ABA pronouncements, as well 
as the most significant written civil procedure norms, the FRCP, are 
chiefly guided by this “traditional conception” of private litigation 
wherein “private parties” and their “private rights” are at issue. 
To govern judicial conduct, the ABA initially adopted the Canons of 
Judicial Ethics on July 9, 1924 (“1924 Canons”).13  The Canons were 
superseded by the Code of Judicial Conduct, adopted by the ABA in 
1972 (“1972 Code”)14 and revised and adopted in the 1990 Model Code 
of Judicial Conduct (“1990 Code”).15  The later Code more closely 
followed the traditional judicial role envisioned by Professor Chayes. 
                                                     
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. at 1283. 
 11. Id. 
 12. See David A. Sklansky & Stephen C. Yeazell, Comparative Law Without Leaving Home: 
What Civil Procedure Can Teach Criminal Procedure, and Vice Versa, 94 GEO. L.J. 683, 698 
(2006) (notwithstanding Chayes’s claim “that civil suits affecting ‘only private interests’ were a 
dwindling species, . . . [t]he notion that civil litigation is first and foremost an arena for the 
adjudication of private disputes—disputes in which the public plays no role aside from providing a 
neutral arbitrator—proved remarkably durable”). 
 13. CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS (1924). 
 14. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (1972). 
 15. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (1990). 
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The 1924 Canons declared “ethical standards” in the hope they 
would “become habits of life” for judges.16  However, these canons 
simply described appropriate judicial behavior in broad terms without 
detailing the range of judicial duties.  Thus, Canon 5, on essential 
conduct, declared a judge should be “temperate, attentive, patient, 
impartial and . . . studious of the principles of the law and diligent in 
endeavoring to ascertain the facts.”17  Canon 19, on judicial opinions, 
stated a trial judge “should indicate reasons” when “disposing of 
controverted cases,” thereby showing no serious arguments of counsel 
were “disregarded or overlooked”; demonstrating the judge’s “full 
understanding”; promoting “confidence”; and avoiding any “suspicion of 
arbitrary conclusion.”18  Additionally, Canon 34, summarizing judicial 
obligation, noted that a judge should be “above reproach” as well as 
“conscientious, studious, thorough, courteous, patient, punctual, just, 
impartial, fearless of public clamor . . . and indifferent to private political 
or partisan influences.”19 
The 1924 Canons were superseded on August 16, 1972 when the 
ABA adopted the Code of Judicial Conduct.20  Unlike the 1924 Canons, 
the 1972 Code spoke to a range of judicial duties.  Canon 3, on the 
impartial and diligent performance of the duties of a judicial office, set 
forth “standards.”21  These standards were divided into categories of 
judicial duties, including adjudicative responsibilities; administrative 
responsibilities (involving, in part, the direction of staff and court 
officials); disqualification (involving grounds for questioning judicial 
impartiality); and remittal of disqualification (involving waivers of 
certain bases for judicial disqualification).22 
Within the section on adjudicative responsibilities, the 1972 
standards, at times, were sufficiently broad to cover judicial conduct on 
and off the record and to encompass decision making responsibilities that 
extended beyond pleaded claims and named parties.  Thus, one standard 
stated a judge “should maintain order and decorum in proceedings.”23  
Another required a judge to be “patient, dignified, and courteous” to 
litigants, lawyers, and “others with whom” the judge “deals” in an 
                                                     
 16. CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS pmbl. (1924). 
 17. Id. at Canon 5.  Canon 5 referred to a judge in the masculine until 1957.  Id. 
 18. Id. at Canon 19. 
 19. Id. at Canon 34. 
 20. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (1972). 
 21. Id. at Canon 3. 
 22. Id. at Canon 3A–D. 
 23. Id. at Canon 3A(2). 
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“official capacity.”24  Yet another required a judge to “accord to every 
person who is legally interested in a proceeding . . . full right to be heard 
according to law.”25 
In August 1990, the ABA revised the 1972 Code.  Under the new 
Model Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3 continues to address the 
impartial and diligent performance of judicial duties and set forth 
“standards.”26  The specific judicial duties in 1990 were said to include 
adjudicative responsibilities, administrative responsibilities, disciplinary 
responsibilities, and disqualification.27  Many of the standards from the 
1972 Code remained.  The 1990 Code continued to speak of 
“proceedings” before the judge,28 responsibilities to “others” beyond 
litigants, jurors, witnesses, and lawyers,29 and “the right to be heard” for 
“every person” who has a legal interest in a proceeding.30 
Unfortunately, however, many of the 1972 standards were replaced 
in 1990 by standards that did not address trial court duties beyond 
pleaded claims and named parties.  For example, while the 1972 Code 
declared a judge “should dispose promptly of the business of the 
court,”31 the 1990 Code said a judge “shall dispose of all judicial matters 
promptly, efficiently, and fairly.”32  The accompanying 1972 Code 
commentary spoke of punctuality “in attending court” and expedition “in 
determining matters under submission.”33  The relevant 1990 Code 
commentary not only repeated those admonitions, but also spoke of 
extending “due regard for the rights of parties,” of monitoring and 
supervising “cases,” and of facilitating settlements by “parties.”34  These 
additional directives describe judicial duties more narrowly, limiting 
them to “cases,” a term of art that often does not embody all of the 
disputes within a civil lawsuit, and to “parties,” another term of art that 
typically excludes many who have disputed legal interests that are  
 
                                                     
 24. Id. at Canon 3A(3). 
 25. Id. at Canon 3A(4). 
 26. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3 (1990). 
 27. Id. at Canons 3B–E.  Of course, states do not always completely follow the ABA proposal.  
See, e.g., N.C. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canons 3A–3D (2006) (stating that judicial duties 
encompass adjudicative responsibilities, administrative responsibilities, disqualification, and remittal 
of disqualification). 
 28. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3B(3) (1990). 
 29. Id. at Canon 3B(4). 
 30. Id. at Canon 3B(7). 
 31. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3A(5) (1972). 
 32. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3B(8) (1990). 
 33. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3A(5) cmt. (1972). 
 34. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3B(8) cmt. (1990). 
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resolved in civil judicial proceedings (such as lienholders, those with 
subrogation rights, and insurers).35 
Similarly, the 1972 Code and 1990 Code both generally prohibited 
ex parte communications between judges and certain persons.36  Yet the 
1972 Code simply said a judge should “neither initiate nor consider ex 
parte or other communications concerning a pending or impending 
proceeding” except as “authorized by law.”37  By contrast, the 1990 
Code’s standards on ex parte communications specifically authorized 
certain communications (i.e., for scheduling or administrative 
purposes)38 and authorized separate conferencing, “with the consent of 
the parties,” involving a judge, one party, and that party’s lawyer “in an 
effort to mediate or settle matters pending before the judge.”39  Thus, in 
1990, there was no recognition of barriers to ex parte conferencing with 
nonparties who were legally interested in pending civil proceedings (as a 
result of liens, insurance contracts, or subrogation interests). 
As the 1924 Canons evolved into a 1972 Code, and later into the 
1990 Code, the judicial role was more particularly and narrowly defined, 
with an increasing view of adjudicative responsibilities as involving 
cases and parties rather than pending matters and persons legally 
interested.  The view of the judicial role within the 1990 Code is 
consistent with Professor Chayes’s view of “traditional” civil litigation.40 
Currently there is discussion about revising the 1990 Code.41  But to 
date there has been little movement away from the perspective that 
judicial conduct in civil cases involves only “traditional” duties.  Under a 
December 2005 draft, Canon 2 would encompass guidelines on judicial 
conduct involving the impartial and diligent performance of the duties of 
a judicial office.42  The proposed Canon 2 has guidelines in various 
                                                     
 35. Id.  An example with an approach similar to the 1972 Code is Canon 3 of the Pennsylvania 
Code of Judicial Conduct, which speaks of a “full right to be heard” for “every person who is legally 
interested in a proceeding.”  PA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(a)(4) (2002). 
 36. See generally MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3B(7) (1990); CODE OF 
JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3A(4) (1972). 
 37. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3A(4) (1972). 
 38. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3B(7)(a) (1990). 
 39. Id. at Canon 3B(7)(d). 
 40. See Chayes, supra note 5, at 1283 (describing the trial judge as a “neutral arbiter” of 
interactions among parties). 
 41. Judicial Code Panel Postpones Final Report for Further Consideration of Difficult Issues, 
22 ABA/BNA LAW. MANUAL ON PROF. CONDUCT 193, 193 (2006). 
 42. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2 (Final Draft Report Dec. 14, 2005) 
[hereinafter 2005 Draft], available at http://www.abanet.org/judicialethics/finaldraftreport.html.  In 
April 2006, Commission Chair Mark I. Harrison said he hoped the commission would finish its work 
and present its proposals to the ABA in February 2007.  Judicial Code Panel Postpones Final 
Report for Further Consideration of Difficult Issues, supra note 41, at 193. 
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categories, including adjudication (continuing much of the 1990 Code 
materials on adjudicative responsibilities, disqualification, and remittal 
of disqualification)43 and administration (containing much of 1990 Code 
materials on administrative responsibilities).44 
Within the section on adjudication, the proposed standards of 2005 
continue to describe—broadly at times—judicial conduct in civil cases.  
The standards speak of a duty to “hear and decide matters assigned,”45 to 
“decide all cases with impartiality and fairness”46 (though the 
accompanying comment states that this duty goes “to all parties”47), to 
perform diligently all judicial duties, “disposing of all judicial matters 
promptly and efficiently,”48 and to “accord to every person who has a 
legal interest in a proceeding . . . the right to be heard according to law”49 
(though the accompanying comment on judicial oversight of settlements 
states that this duty embodies protecting “a party’s right to be heard” and 
repeatedly refers to settlements involving “parties”50).  Elsewhere the 
2005 proposed standards on adjudication speak more narrowly of the 
interests of “parties,” as in the sections on ex parte communications and 
disqualification.  Thus, one proposed standard declares: “A judge may, 
with the consent of the parties, confer separately with the parties and 
their lawyers in an effort to settle matters pending before the judge.”51  
Another states: “A judge shall disqualify himself or herself in any 
proceeding . . . where . . . the judge has a personal bias or prejudice 
concerning a party or a party’s lawyer . . . .”52  There are no express bars 
on separate conferencing with, or bias toward, nonparties who are legally 
interested.  The 2005 proposed amendments to the Model Code of 
Judicial Conduct continue to focus on “parties” rather than on persons 
with legal interests and on the pleaded claims rather than on all “matters” 
in dispute. 
The traditional perspective on the role of the trial judge, as described 
by Professor Chayes, continues in other ABA pronouncements.  For 
                                                     
 43. 2005 Draft, supra note 42, at Canons 2.05–2.12. 
 44. Id. at Canons 2.13–2.20.  Reporting misconduct provisions (containing much of the 1990 
Code materials and disciplinary responsibilities) are located within the section dealing with 
administration.  Id. at Canons 2.17–2.18. 
 45. Id. at Canon 2.05. 
 46. Id. at Canon 2.06. 
 47. Id. at Canon 2.06 cmt. 3. 
 48. Id. at Canon 2.03. 
 49. Id. at Canon 2.09. 
 50. Id. at Canon 2.09 cmt. 2. 
 51. Id. at Canon 2.10(A)(3). 
 52. Id. at Canon 2.12(A)(1). 
PARNESS FINAL.DOC 1/12/2007  2:58:09 PM 
2006] AMERICAN GENERAL JURISDICTION TRIAL COURTS 197 
example, the first Standards Relating to Trial Courts (“1976 Trial Court 
Standards”) were approved by the ABA House of Delegates in February 
1976.53  Within the commentary accompanying section 2.00 (“Fair and 
Effective Procedures: General Principle”), there was a discussion of 
“Supervisory Functions,” including work with decedents’ estates, 
juvenile services, and probation services for criminal offenders,54 as well 
as “Other Dispute-Resolving Procedures.”55  Within the latter, trial courts 
were admonished to give “due recognition” both to the “jurisdiction of 
administrative and quasi-judicial boards and agencies” (requiring 
“appropriate deference”)56 and to “the role of arbitration in the resolution 
of legal controversies,” involving active encouragement of “voluntary 
reference to arbitration.”57  Here, trial courts either provided “a forum for 
review” or “enforcement”58 responsibilities that were distinguished from 
civil case processing.  Within section 2.02, on Procedure in Civil Cases, 
the 1976 Trial Court Standards required “[p]leadings” that reasonably 
informed “parties” of “claims and defenses,”59 liberal laws on “joinder of 
claims and parties,”60 and summary treatment of “insufficient” claims 
and defenses.61  The accompanying commentary urged that there be 
“[p]rocess rules” making it “possible for all appropriate parties to be 
joined.”62 
By February 1992, the Trial Court Standards had been altered 
significantly.63  Section 2.00 included discussions of “Supervisory 
Functions” and, to replace “Other Dispute-Resolving Procedures,” 
discussions of both “Administrative Tribunals,” where “appropriate 
deference” was still required, and “Alternative Dispute Resolution 
Programs.”64  The latter covered “court-annexed or court-referred” 
arbitrations as well as mediations and conciliations before nonjudges.65  
Yet, this part of section 2.00 was limited in application.  It referenced 
only the procedural opportunities for “the parties.”66  Section 2.02 on 
                                                     
 53. STANDARDS RELATING TO TRIAL COURTS (1976). 
 54. Id. § 2.00 cmt. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. § 2.02(b). 
 60. Id. § 2.02(c). 
 61. Id. § 2.02(e). 
 62. Id. § 2.02 cmt. 
 63. STANDARDS RELATING TO TRIAL COURTS (1992). 
 64. Id. § 2.00. 
 65. Id. 
 66. See id. (stating the “widest range of alternatives can be provided consistent with protecting 
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civil case procedure remained substantially unchanged, with provisions 
directed to “joinder of claims and parties”67 and to “parties . . . 
obtain[ing] reasonable disclosure” of facts and laws at issue.68 
As with ABA pronouncements, the FRCP, from their 
implementation in the late 1930s, have also chiefly reflected the vision 
described by Professor Chayes.  Since many states have substantially 
modeled their written civil procedure laws on the FRCP, the account by 
Professor Chayes is largely compatible with existing state court rules and 
statutes on civil case processes.69  Under the contemporary FRCP, the 
adversaries are parties, often represented by lawyers,70 who present, or 
defend against, a “claim for relief”;71 who undertake the various methods 
of formal “discovery”;72 who make or oppose a “motion” related to a 
pending claim;73 and who undertake pretrial, trial, and post-trial efforts 
aimed at “claim” resolution.74  Further, jurors may only render a “special 
verdict” on issues “which might properly be made under the 
pleadings.”75  A judgment in a case involving “multiple claims” or 
“multiple parties” may be limited to the resolution of only a single 
“claim,” whether presented in a “claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or 
third-party claim.”76  Further, an offer of judgment often may only be 
made by “a party defending against a claim.”77  So, like ABA principles, 
the FRCP and state civil procedure laws speak mostly to parties with 
their claims, rather than to the broader group of persons who are “legally 
interested” or to the broader range of disputes that are possibly subject to 
resolution with judicial assistance. 
The United States Judicial Code, embodying congressional directives 
that structure and guide the Article III judiciary of the federal 
government, similarly speaks to parties and their claims rather than to all 
persons with legal interests in dispute resolution.  For example, claims 
                                                                                                                                  
the rights of the parties,” and noting the “opportunity for the parties to choose an ADR 
professional”). 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. But see John B. Oakley, A Fresh Look at the Federal Rules in State Courts, 3 NEV. L.J. 
354, 355 (2002/2003) (“Federal procedure is less influential in state courts today than at anytime in 
the past quarter-century.”). 
 70. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(a). 
 71. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)–(b). 
 72. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 26 (stating the general provisions governing discovery). 
 73. FED. R. CIV. P. 7, 11. 
 74. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a)–(b) (discussing summary judgment for claimant or 
defendant); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 59(a) (discussing grounds for a new trial). 
 75. FED. R. CIV. P. 49(a). 
 76. FED. R. CIV. P. 54(b). 
 77. FED. R. CIV. P. 68. 
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are at the core of the supplemental jurisdiction statute, a law that 
describes only some of the federal courts’ adjudicatory authority over 
disputes that are factually related to pending diversity or federal question 
claims.78  Pendent and ancillary adjudicatory authority under federal 
precedents are broader than the statutory supplemental authority as they 
may not involve the named parties at all.  Additionally, the convenience 
of the parties, rather than of all those who are legally interested, is at the 
core of the change of venue statute.  However, there is a reference to 
considerations of what “justice” demands.79 
The Chayes/ABA/FRCP vision of trial court adjudicatory authority, 
emphasizing named parties and their claims rather than all those who are 
legally interested in the event(s) prompting the presentation of those 
claims, dominates the teaching of civil procedure in American law 
schools, usually in the first year.  For example, Professor Yeazell’s very 
popular civil procedure book begins with “a simple and plausible fact 
situation” involving a college student from Michigan who, while visiting 
his parents in Illinois, gets into a car accident with a lifelong Illinois 
resident.80  The fact pattern is developed in the first chapter to introduce 
subjects such as jurisdiction,81 venue,82 pleading and motion practice,83 
joinder (where the student had a passenger, there was a third car 
involved, or there was shoddy work done by a mechanic),84 discovery,85 
summary judgment,86 trial,87 appeals,88 and preclusion.89  Insurance is 
only mentioned in an illustrative case, where an insurer files a lawsuit 
seeking to recover what it paid to its insured for the damage caused by 
the defendant.90  There is no talk of insurers as lienholders, of insurers as 
nonparties who are nevertheless on the hook for judgments against their 
insureds, or of insurance policy coverage issues.  There is no talk of 
other lienholders, likely including the plaintiff’s very own attorney.  
Early on in Professors Friedenthal, Miller, Sexton, and Hershkoff’s civil 
                                                     
 78. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (2000) (speaking to jurisdiction over “all other claims”); id. § 
1367(c) (guiding a district court on its discretion to decline jurisdiction “over a claim”). 
 79. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2000). 
 80. STEVEN C. YEAZELL, CIVIL PROCEDURE 2 (6th ed. 2004). 
 81. Id. at 4–11. 
 82. Id. at 11. 
 83. Id. at 12–23. 
 84. Id. at 24–27. 
 85. Id. at 28–34. 
 86. Id. at 34–39. 
 87. Id. at 39–45. 
 88. Id. at 51–55. 
 89. Id. at 45–53. 
 90. Id. at 46–50.  The illustrative case is Rush v. City of Maple Heights, 147 N.E.2d 599 (1958). 
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procedure book, there is comparably “a relatively uncluttered 
hypothetical case” involving a car accident wherein a pedestrian sues the 
employer of the driver who caused the injuries.91  Again, little is said 
about lienholders, including attorneys, medical providers, and insurers, 
or about insurers of the named defendants. 
III. NEW CIVIL CASE RESPONSIBILITIES: FEWER TRIALS, MORE THAN 
PLEADED CLAIMS, MORE JUDICIALLY MANAGED SETTLEMENTS, 
AND MORE APPEALS 
ABA standards and federal and state contemporary civil procedure 
laws continue to speak only to parties, rather than to the broader array of 
legally interested persons, and to claims, rather than to all “matters” that 
may be resolved in private civil cases.  Yet trial courts increasingly face 
far fewer trials in certain types of private disputes; help resolve more 
claims than those pleaded; initiate more settlement talks that occur 
beyond court-directed outside arbitrations, mediations, or conciliations; 
and hear more appeals.  Unfortunately, these trial court responsibilities 
remain substantially unrecognized or unguided in the ABA standards or 
in written American civil procedure laws. 
A. Fewer Trials 
There are fewer trials for certain private civil claims today, such as 
consumer and civil rights in employment, because of the expansive 
readings of the Federal Arbitration Act92 by the Supreme Court of the 
United States,93 as well as the related explosion in the numbers of 
compulsory and binding arbitration contracts covering future civil 
disputes.94  The FAA generally declares that “a contract evidencing a 
transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy 
thereafter arising out of such contract . . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and 
enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the 
revocation of any contract.”95  In Allied-Bruce Terminix Companies v. 
                                                     
 91. JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL, ARTHUR R. MILLER, JOHN E. SEXTON & HELEN HERSHKOFF, CIVIL 
PROCEDURE 5 (9th ed. 2005); see also ALLAN IDES & CHRISTOPHER N. MAY, CIVIL PROCEDURE: 
CASES AND PROBLEMS 8–19 (2d ed. 2006) (presenting a typical hypothetical case involving a 
bicycle accident). 
 92. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–14 (2000). 
 93. See infra notes 96–102 and accompanying text (discussing two such cases). 
 94. See infra notes 103–04 and accompanying text (citing several articles on this topic). 
 95. 9 U.S.C. § 2. 
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Dobson,96 in 1995, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that the Act, grounded 
on Commerce Clause powers, preempts state antiarbitration laws and 
applies in state courts.97  The Court also broadened the Act so as to cover 
not only contracts contemplating substantial interstate activity, but also 
contracts that, in fact, only turned out to involve some interstate 
commerce.98  The Act exempts “contracts of employment of seamen, 
railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or 
interstate commerce.”99  However, in 2001 the Supreme Court, in Circuit 
City Stores, Inc. v. Adams,100 limited the exemption to contracts of 
employees whose work clearly contemplated interstate commerce, such 
as transportation workers.101  Thus, the Act applies to employees whose 
actual work involves some degree of interstate commerce.102 
As a result of these and other Supreme Court decisions, there has 
been an explosion in the number of enforceable contracts mandating 
arbitration of future civil claims.  There is no indication that this 
escalation will end anytime soon.  If anything, it seems the biggest bangs 
are yet to be heard.  These contractual arbitrations occur outside of 
American trial courts, precluding traditional trials.  Thus, for many 
disputes arising out of consumer purchases103 or private employment,104 
there are far fewer possible trials today than in the prearbitration era. 
There is also much evidence that, even for civil claims that continue 
to be filed and resolved in American trial courts regularly, there are 
                                                     
 96. 513 U.S. 265 (1995). 
 97. Id. at 272, 275. 
 98. Id. at 277. 
 99. 9 U.S.C. § 1. 
 100. 532 U.S. 105 (2001). 
 101. Id. at 121.  The Court based its decision on the rationale that the phrase “‘engaged in 
commerce’ is narrower than the more open-ended formulations ‘affecting commerce’ or ‘involving 
commerce.’”  Id. at 118. 
 102. See id. at 121 (“It would be rational for Congress to ensure that workers in general would 
be covered by the provisions of the FAA, while reserving for itself more specific legislation for 
those engaged in transportation.”). 
 103. For a review and critique of the burgeoning private compelled and binding arbitrations 
involving consumer purchases, see, for example, Christopher R. Drahozal, “Unfair” Arbitration 
Clauses, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 695, 698 (2001), which uses empirical methods to analyze predispute 
arbitration pacts in consumer agreements, and Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: 
Is It “Just?”, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1631, 1635 (2005), which argues that “mandatory arbitration is 
problematic for two fundamental reasons: lack of consent and lack of public scrutiny.” 
 104. For a review and critique of the burgeoning compelled and binding private arbitrations 
involving private employment disputes, see, for example, Cynthia Estlund, Rebuilding the Law of 
the Workplace in an Era of Self-Regulation, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 319, 324–25 (2005), which 
suggests the use of monitored self-regulation, with monitors who are independent of employers and 
accountable to employees and the public. 
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fewer trials.105  Whatever the reasons for the decreasing number of civil 
jury trials,106 written civil procedure laws chiefly premised on a “jury-
based legal culture” are grounded on “legend” rather than on the 
“reality” of contemporary civil litigation.107 
B. More than Pleaded Claims 
There is also increasing trial court authority over legal issues, 
including claims, that are factually related to pending private civil 
actions, but that do not involve any of the expressly named parties.  For 
example, in civil litigation today, two insurers of two opposing parties 
may be at odds and may be the real adversaries.  Furthermore, a 
plaintiff’s attorney, via a contingency fee agreement, or a plaintiff’s 
creditor, via a lien, are more likely to assert a property interest in the 
proceeds of any monetary recovery by the plaintiff than they were fifty 
years ago.108  Increased federal district court authority over disputes 
                                                     
 105. See, e.g., Murray, supra note 3, at 53 (reviewing the numbers of civil jury verdicts in 
Massachusetts state trial courts from 1925 to 2003 and reporting there were 3022 civil jury verdicts 
in 1925 and 586 in 2003); Judith Resnik, Procedure as Contract, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 593, 
616–17 (2005) (“In the early 1940s, about fifteen percent of federal civil cases ended with a trial.  In 
1962, [this was] about twelve percent . . . ; today, trials are begun in about two percent of the civil 
docket.  . . . [E]ven the absolute number of civil trials has decreased, from about 5800 in 1982 to 
about 4600 in 2002.” (citations omitted)).  See generally Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An 
Examination of Trials and Related Matters in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL 
STUD. 459, 459 (2004) (reviewing data compiled by the Administrative Office of the United States 
Courts on federal district courts for 1962 to 2002).  The reasons for the decline are disputed.  See, 
e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, Keeping Our Ambition Under Control: The Limits of Data and Inference 
in Searching for the Causes and Consequences of Vanishing Trials in Federal Court, 1 J. EMPIRICAL 
LEGAL STUD. 571, 571 (2004) (reflecting on Galanter’s work and arguing that “Galanter may 
underestimate the influence of both changing demand for court services . . . and of changing demand 
of judicial services on the trial rate”). 
 106. See Murray, supra note 3, at 58–59 (suggesting, inter alia, increased use of summary 
judgment and alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, as well as the expense and unpredictability 
of jury verdicts). 
 107. Professor Murray observes: 
Most of the members of the current generation of mature American lawyers and judges 
received their legal education . . . in a culture in which the jury trial was at the core . . . . 
Fifty or more years ago, this jury-based legal culture had some real connection 
with reality.  A fair proportion of the lawyers and many of the judges were actually 
involved in civil jury trials on a regular basis.  . . . 
The current statistics make it clear that by comparison with previous generations, 
lawyers and judges of today are living [in] a legal culture in which trial by jury is more a 
legend than a reality . . . .  The trend . . . strongly suggests that the role of the civil jury 
trial in our legal culture today is based on a past, rather than a present, reality. 
Id. at 60. 
 108. See, e.g., Samuel A. Perroni & Mona J. McNutt, Criminal Contingency Fee Arrangements: 
How Fair Are They?, 16 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 211, 241 (noting that in the 1980s lawyers began 
“utilizing contingency fee agreements more frequently and more innovatively”).  But see Marc 
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involving nonparties was expressly recognized by the Supreme Court in 
1994 in Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Insurance Co. of America.109  The 
Court declared that in the absence of a statutory basis, a federal district 
court could exercise 
ancillary jurisdiction . . . for two separate, though sometimes related, 
purposes: (1) to permit disposition by a single court of claims that are, 
in varying respects and degrees, factually interdependent . . . and (2) to 
enable a court to function successfully, that is, to manage its 
proceedings, vindicate its authority and effectuate its decrees.110 
The aforementioned general statute on supplemental jurisdiction only 
partially addresses federal subject matter jurisdiction over factually 
interdependent nonparty claims.111  It seemingly permits jurisdiction both 
over claims between parties and over nonparty claims, as it authorizes 
“supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to 
claims” already presented under diversity or federal question original 
jurisdiction “that they form part of the same case or controversy.”112  The 
federal statute does not expressly demand that all supplemental claims 
that were heard or otherwise resolved could have been joined, pleaded, 
or otherwise formally presented.113  Little else is said of nonparties in the 
supplemental jurisdiction statute.  For example, it does not recognize 
Supreme Court precedent indicating that the ancillary adjudicatory 
authority, always discretionary in nature, operates differently for related 
nonparty claims than for related claims between parties.114  The Court 
has said that ancillary authority over factually interdependent claims is 
less available when the claims involve “parties not named in any claim 
that is independently cognizable by the federal court,” as such claims are 
“fundamentally different” than claims involving named parties.115  
Beyond the necessary relatedness, the Court has also said that federal 
adjudicatory authority over nonparty claims requires “an examination of 
the posture” in which the claims were asserted and the “specific statute 
that confers [original] jurisdiction over” the pleaded claims involving the 
                                                                                                                                  
Galanter, Anyone Can Fall Down a Manhole: The Contingency Fee and Its Discontents, 47 DEPAUL 
L. REV. 457, 474 (1998) (acknowledging hints of decline in contingency fee use). 
 109. 511 U.S. 375 (1994). 
 110. Id. at 379–80 (citations omitted). 
 111. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (2000). 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545, 549 (1989), superseded by statute, 28 U.S.C. § 
1367(a) (2000), as recognized in Exxon Mobile Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 125 S. Ct. 2611, 
2613 (2005). 
PARNESS FINAL.DOC 1/12/2007  2:58:09 PM 
204 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55 
parties.116  The supplemental jurisdiction statute is too silent on trial court 
adjudicatory authority involving nonparties.117  In state civil procedure 
rules and statutes,118 as well, the roles played in civil litigation by 
“legally interested” nonparties often remain unscripted.119 
Nonparty claims often involve insurers.120  “At times, the insurers, as 
nonparties, seek judicial remedies from [their insureds who are] parties, 
as when they place liens on the proceeds of any judgments or out-of-
court settlements [the insureds] may obtain as [party] claimants.”121  
Remedies may even be pursued at times by nonparty insurers against 
other nonparty insurers (i.e., where both parties are insured).122  Thus, 
“nonparty insurers of plaintiffs may seek to resolve [disputes] against 
nonparty insurers of defendants that are related to the pending claims  
 
                                                     
 116. Id. at 551 (citing Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 373 (1978)). 
 117. Jeffrey A. Parness & Daniel J. Sennott, Expanded Recognition in Written Laws of Ancillary 
Federal Court Powers: Supplementing the Supplemental Jurisdiction Statute, 64 U. PITT. L. REV. 
303, 304–05 (2003) (suggesting the elimination of uncertainty and confusion through statutory 
amendments reflecting the Kokkonen analysis); see also Myers v. Richland County, 429 F.3d 740, 
747, 749–50 (8th Cir. 2005) (stating that ancillary enforcement jurisdiction, while a “viable 
doctrine,” was not codified in the supplemental jurisdiction statute; enforcement authority is 
recognized in a new lawsuit in the same court brought by a third-party beneficiary to a settlement in 
an earlier lawsuit wherein enforcement jurisdiction was expressly retained). 
 118. Many state trial courts are unlike federal district courts in that they are constitutionally 
established general jurisdiction courts.  For example, in Illinois circuit courts have “original 
jurisdiction of all justiciable matters.”  ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 9.  Because of this, a Kokkonen-type 
analysis often develops wholly without statute or through court rules.  The analysis may develop 
without statute through, for example, judicial precedents, as in Paulucci v. General Dynamics Corp., 
842 So. 2d 797, 801–03 (Fla. 2003), employing an “inherent power” analysis regarding same-case 
enforcement of a settlement approved by the trial court.  It may develop through court rules, as in 
TEX. R. CIV. P. 11, which requires agreements between parties or attorneys regarding pending suits 
to be in writing.  Unlike congressional authority over federal district court jurisdiction, authorized by 
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1, which states “[t]he judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in . . 
. such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish, similar state 
legislative authority over the establishment and over what is heard by state general jurisdiction trial 
courts can be precluded by the judicial article of the state constitution.  See, e.g., FLA. CONST. art. V, 
§ 1 (“The judicial power shall be vested in a supreme court, district courts of appeal, circuit courts 
and county courts.  No other courts may be established by the state . . . .”).  State high court cases 
seeking guidance from Kokkonen include Hanson v. Board of Education, 479 S.E.2d 305, 309 (W. 
Va. 1996) and Amantiad v. Odum, 977 P.2d 160, 167–68 (Haw. 1999). 
 119. But see, e.g., MICH. CT. R. 5.125(C)(6) (stating that in a proceeding for an examination of 
an account of a fiduciary, notice must be given to “interested persons,” who include “insurers and 
sureties who might be subject to financial obligations as the result of the approval of the account”). 
 120. See Jeffrey A. Parness & Tait J. Lundgren, Nonparty Insurers in Federal Civil Actions: The 
Need for New Written Civil Procedure Laws, 36 CREIGHTON L. REV. 191, 196 (2003) (“Nonparty 
claims adjudicated in federal civil actions often involve insurers.”). 
 121. Id. at 196–97. 
 122. See id. at 197 (“Conceivably, similar remedies may even be pursued by nonparty insurers 
against other nonparties . . . .”). 
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between the plaintiffs and defendants”123 (e.g., disputes regarding 
insurance coverage). 
C. More Judicially Managed Settlements 
In American trial courts today, there are also more judicially 
managed settlement talks involving private civil disputes.  Consider the 
evolution of FRCP 16 since its appearance in 1938.124  As with other 
FRCP, this federal rule is followed in many states.125  Initially, FRCP 16 
was entitled “Pre-Trial Procedure; Formulating Issues.”126  It made no 
explicit mention of settlement; rather, it addressed trial preparation 
conferences regarding simplifying issues, amending pleadings, avoiding 
unnecessary proof, limiting experts, and referring to factual issue 
matters.127 
FRCP 16 was considerably amended in 1983.128  The title changed to 
“Pretrial Conferences; Scheduling; Management.”129  It required early 
scheduling and planning conferences for many civil cases and anticipated 
multiple conferences before trial.130  It broadened judicial authority to 
reach unrepresented parties as well as attorneys.131  “Facilitating the 
settlement of the case” became a valid objective of pretrial 
conferences.132  The new rule suggested “the possibility of settlement” as 
a subject for discussion at pretrial conferences.133  It did not list possible 
participants in conferences.134  However, it stated that “at least one of the 
attorneys for each party participating in any conference before trial shall 
                                                     
 123. Id. 
 124. The changes in the pretrial conference work of federal district judges in civil cases since 
1938 are reviewed in Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 374–432 (1982).  
There have been no comparable changes in criminal case responsibilities where settlement 
facilitation remains, for the most part, with the parties.  See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1) (stating 
“[t]he court must not participate in . . . discussions” relating to a plea agreement); ILL. SUP. CT. R. 
402(d)(1) (“The trial judge shall not initiate plea discussions.”). 
 125. See Jeffrey A. Parness & Matthew R. Walker, Thinking Outside the Civil Case Box: 
Reformulating Pretrial Conference Laws, 50 U. KAN. L. REV. 347, 349–53 (2002) (reviewing 
contemporary state court practices under 1938, 1983, and 1993 versions of FED. R. CIV. P. 16). 
 126. FED. R. CIV. P. 16, 308 U.S. 645, 684 (1938) (amended 1983, 1987, and 1993). 
 127. Parness & Walker, supra note 125, at 350–53 (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 16, 308 U.S. at 684). 
 128. Id. at 350. 
 129. FED. R. CIV. P. 16, 97 F.R.D. 165, 201 (1983); Parness & Walker, supra note 125, at 350 
(citing the 1983 version of FED. R. CIV. P. 16). 
 130. Parness & Walker, supra note 125, at 350 (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 16, 97 F.R.D. at 201–05). 
 131. Id. (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 16(a), 97 F.R.D. at 201). 
 132. Id. (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 16(a)(5), 97 F.R.D. at 201). 
 133. Id. (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 16(c), 97 F.R.D. at 203). 
 134. Id. 
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have authority to enter into stipulations and to make admissions 
regarding all matters that the participants may reasonably anticipate may 
be discussed.”135  This suggests that the rule limits participants to parties 
and/or their attorneys.136 
The Advisory Committee noted that FRCP 16 was a success partly 
due to improvement and expansion of the settlement process.137  It stated 
that pretrial conferences for the sole purpose of settlement could be 
desirable and that “settlement should be facilitated at as early a stage of 
the litigation as possible.”138  However, it noted that a mandatory 
settlement conference “would be a waste of time in many cases.”139 
The most recent amendment to FRCP 16 occurred in 1993.140  The 
1993 changes merely refined the previous rule.141  It suggests judges be 
more active in the pretrial conferences.142  As opposed to the 1983 
version offering “the possibility of settlement” as a possible subject for 
pretrial conference, the 1993 version advises the court may “take 
appropriate actions” regarding settlement.143  Under the 1993 Rule, 
judges may “require that a party or its representative be present or 
reasonably available by telephone in order to consider possible 
settlement of the dispute.”144 
D. More Appeals 
American trial courts today undertake far more review of decisions 
on civil claims made elsewhere.  This increase seemingly resulted from 
expanding use of administrative tribunals and other governmental dispute 
resolution bodies to resolve initially private civil disputes.  As well, there 
have been increasing numbers of civil claims arbitrated under federal and 
                                                     
 135. Id. (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 16(c), 97 F.R.D. at 204). 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. at 351. 
 138. Id. (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 16 advisory committee’s note, 97 F.R.D. at 210). 
 139. Id. (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 16 advisory committee’s note, 97 F.R.D. at 210). 
 140. FED. R. CIV. P. 16, 146 F.R.D. 401, 597–601 (1993); Parness & Walker, supra note 125, at 
351 (citing the 1993 version of Rule 16). 
 141. Parness & Walker, supra note 125, at 351. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 16(c), 146 F.R.D. at 600). 
 144. Id. (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 16(c)(14), 146 F.R.D. at 601).  Since 1993 the rule has attracted 
critics.  For example, Professor Judith Resnik laments: “In the contemporary rule, we find the 
managerial judge, the settlement judge, the dealmaking judge, the judge promoting alternative 
dispute resolution, and thus the Los Angeles judge telling lawyers that to go to trial was to admit 
failure of this (new) system.”  Judith Resnik, Trial as Error, Jurisdiction as Injury: Transforming the 
Meaning of Article III, 113 HARV. L. REV. 924, 937 (2000). 
PARNESS FINAL.DOC 1/12/2007  2:58:09 PM 
2006] AMERICAN GENERAL JURISDICTION TRIAL COURTS 207 
state acts that require trial courts perform the appellate, or quasi-
appellate, process of confirmation, allowing the courts to then enforce 
arbitration awards. 
The expanding use of administrative tribunals to resolve private civil 
claims in the first instance has been legislatively mandated.  However, 
the delegation doctrine limits legislators.  It requires certain core 
governmental responsibilities be left to only one of the three 
governmental branches set out constitutionally.145  This means that there 
may be some essential judicial functions regarding civil case 
resolutions.146  The jury trial right also limits legislators.147  It demands 
that only incidental private interests be adjudicated administratively 
when reasonably necessary to effectuate an administrative agency’s 
primary regulatory purpose.148  Otherwise, American legislators 
ordinarily have leeway in directing certain private claims to agencies, 
albeit with later appellate-type court review.  Constitutionally, many 
state trial courts are simply recognized as having the authority to exercise 
whatever appellate jurisdiction may be provided by law.  In Florida, the 
constitution is more explicit, declaring that the circuit courts “shall have 
the power of direct review of administrative action prescribed by general 
law.”149  Increasingly, trial court review of agency adjudications is 
contemplated by legislatures and guided by procedures found in both a 
general administrative procedure act, governing judicial review of 
determinations from a variety of administrative agencies,150 and in 
                                                     
 145. See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 361 (1989) (holding that sentencing 
guidelines are constitutional); McHugh v. Santa Monica Rent Control Bd., 777 P.2d 91, 93 (Cal. 
1989) (holding unconstitutional administrative remedies provision of city’s rent control law). 
 146. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 386 (recognizing certain governmental functions may be “exclusively 
committed” to one branch of government); McHugh, 777 P.2d at 108 (courts must vigilantly apply 
the “principle of check” in order to preserve for the courts the “true” judicial power).  In the civil 
case arena, a core judicial function is often described as involving the resolution of contested facts in 
a private civil dispute that leads to “an award of unliquidated common law damages for personal 
injuries.”  Broward County v. La Rosa, 505 So. 2d 422, 423–24 (Fla. 1987); see also Walnut Creek 
Manor v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm’n, 814 P.2d 704, 713 (Cal. 1991) (citing Broward 
County, 505 So. 2d at 423–24). 
 147. See, e.g., Granfinanciera S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 33 (1989) (stating Colombian 
Government was not entitled to a jury trial).  As well, state legislatures are occasionally limited by 
state constitutional rights to remedy/open courts provisions.  See, e.g., Gordon L. Roberts & 
Sharrieff Shah, What is Left of Berry v. Beech—The Utah Open Courts Jurisprudence?, 2005 UTAH 
L. REV. 677, 679 (stating there are two ways open courts provisions are read: (1) as procedural, and 
(2) as substantive wherein the legislatures’ ability to control extant remedies is limited). 
 148. Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 55 n.10 (stating that Congress may decline the right to a jury 
trial when the rights at issue are “statutory rights that are integral parts of a public regulatory 
scheme”); see also McHugh, 777 P.2d at 108 (using incidental private rights analysis for separation 
of powers issue). 
 149. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 5 (b). 
 150. See, e.g., Federal Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–59 (2000); Illinois 
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special provisions within enabling legislation outlining special judicial 
review powers relevant to a particular agency.151 
Besides agency decisions, American trial courts undertake more 
appellate-type proceedings today as they review and confirm the 
increasing numbers of arbitration awards under the FAA152 and related 
state arbitration acts.  The FAA and similar state acts expressly recognize 
a reviewing role for trial courts regarding arbitration awards arising from 
disputes governed by compulsory and binding arbitration pacts.  The 
federal act states that federal district courts should normally confirm such 
arbitration awards.  There is some wiggle room, though far less than with 
traditional appellate court review of trial court decisions where there are 
usually de novo (legal questions), clearly erroneous (factual questions), 
and abuse of discretion standards of review.  The FAA only allows a trial 
court to vacate, modify, or correct an arbitration award for very limited 
reasons, such as “corruption, fraud, or undue means” in the procurement 
of the award; “evident partiality or corruption” in any arbitrator; or “an 
evident material mistake.”153  Beyond these grounds, arbitration awards 
will be confirmed unless they direct parties to violate the law.  Thus, as 
the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals said in IDS Life Insurance Co. v. 
Royal Alliance Associates,154 “neither error nor clear error nor even gross 
error is a ground for vacating an award.”155  In that case, the court 
confirmed an arbitration award simply because it was satisfied that the 
arbitrators had resolved the entire dispute and their resolution could be 
figured out, even though their resolution was largely 
“incomprehensible.”156 
IV. NEW VISIONS AND NEW GUIDELINES FOR THE GENERAL 
JURISDICTION TRIAL COURTS 
The new visions of trial courts should prompt changes in written 
civil procedure, professional responsibility, and even certain substantive 
laws.  Laws grounded solely or primarily on Professor Chayes’s narrow 
vision of civil trial courts hearing private-rights cases are inadequate.  
Unfortunately, necessary changes have been slow, resulting in much 
                                                                                                                                  
Adminstrative Review Law, 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/3-101 to -113 (West 2003). 
 151. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 610(c) (2000) (stating a state appealing adverse action on certain 
block grants has ninety days to seek district court review). 
 152. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–307 (2000). 
 153. Id. §§ 10–11. 
 154. 266 F.3d 645 (7th Cir. 2001). 
 155. Id. at 650. 
 156. Id. at 648. 
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confusion and widely differing approaches to common legal issues, even 
within a single multijudge court.  The confusion over judicial settlement 
conferences, settlement talks personally presided over by trial court 
judges, is illustrative.  The divergent judicial approaches, prompted by 
underinclusively written laws with little legislative history, demonstrate 
the dangers of written rules and statutes that expressly reflect, at best, 
only Professor Chayes’s vision of trial court work.157 
The confusion over the calls for increased judicial settlement 
conferencing is exemplified in one federal appellate court ruling 
addressing whether district judges can compel the attendance of 
nonparties, such as insurers.158  The ruling has significant practical 
import as nonparties often hold the keys to amicable and complete civil 
case resolutions.  This confusion would be more easily mitigated upon  
revision of civil trial courts.  With a new perspective, new guidelines on 
judicial settlement conferences could be more readily implemented. 
A. Narrow Vision, Resulting Confusion 
In 1989, in G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Joseph Oat Corp.,159 a 
majority of the Seventh Circuit went beyond the wording of the 1983 
version of FRCP 16 in an attempt to facilitate a just, speedy, and 
inexpensive resolution of a pending civil case.160  A federal magistrate 
                                                     
 157. See, for example, Slansky & Yeazell, supra note 12, at 701, where the authors observe: 
Civil settlements are an arena of great entrepreneurial creativity, welcomed by the rules 
and actively encouraged from the bench.  Encouragement, in fact, is typically the judge’s 
sole role in civil settlement.  The rules have nothing to say about the content of civil 
settlements, and neither, in the vast majority of cases, does the judge presiding over the 
litigation.  The terms of a civil settlement need bear no relation to the outcome dictated 
by substantive law.  Nor need they bear any resemblance to the settlement of a nearly 
identical case being handled in the courtroom next door.  The dark side of unconstrained 
creativity is arbitrary lawlessness. 
 158. There are significant differences among trial court judges on other judicial settlement 
conferencing issues.  See, e.g., Galanter & Cahill, supra note 1, at 1342–43 (discussing a 1980 
nationwide survey of federal and state trial judges showing that 68% intervened “subtly” in judicial 
settlement conferences, 10% intervened “aggressively,” and 22% were “noninterventionist”).  
Another survey showed that 41% of federal judges and 56% of state judges reported they had 
“suggested settlement terms,” though far fewer judges were interventionist in bench trials than in 
jury trials.  Id. at 1343. 
 159. 871 F.2d 648 (7th Cir. 1989) (en banc).  This is not an isolated incident of widely divergent 
views on trial court authority to compel a nonparty’s attendance at a settlement, or settlement-
facilitating, proceedings, be it before the trial judge or another (e.g., mediator, arbitrator, 
conciliator).  Similar views are shown in the notes as the Heileman opinions are described. 
 160. Id. at 652–53.  On occasion, courts do not explore the language of the pertinent pretrial 
conference rule and simply recognize compulsory powers over interested nonparties.  See, e.g., In re 
LaMarre, 494 F.2d 753, 756 (6th Cir. 1974) (finding that court had power to compel an insurance 
company’s appearance because it was liable for any damages owed by the defendant). 
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judge had ordered a defendant’s “corporate representative with authority 
to settle” to attend a pretrial settlement conference.161  The only 
defendant’s representative who appeared was its attorney.162  The trial 
court determined the order was violated and imposed sanctions under 
FRCP 16(f).163  The defendant argued on appeal, to no avail, that the 
contemporary version of FRCP 16 permitted the trial court to order the 
attendance of “attorneys for the parties or any unrepresented parties.”164 
Writing for the majority, Judge Kanne found that FRCP 16 did not 
“completely describe and limit the power of the federal courts,” though 
the “concept that district courts exercise procedural authority outside the 
explicit language of the rules of civil procedure is not frequently 
documented.”165  He reasoned that “the mere absence of language in the 
federal rules . . . should not, and does not, give rise to a negative 
implication of prohibition.”166  Written civil procedure laws only “form 
and shape certain aspects of a court’s inherent powers,” he said, and do 
not bar the continued exercise of those powers “where discretion should 
be available.”167  Judge Kanne concluded that FRCP 16 did not restrict 
district judges in the conduct of pretrial conferences, as written laws do 
not limit, but in fact are “enhanced by,” inherent judicial power.168 
While Judge Kanne found that inherent judicial power enhanced 
FRCP 16, the dissenters in Heileman found the use of such power 
inappropriate, at least in the pending case.169  Some dissenters found that 
any inherent power should not encompass mandated attendance by a 
represented party, its agent, or any others not mentioned in the rule.170 
In dissent, Judge Posner explained that under the written federal rule, 
the “main purpose of the pretrial conference is to get ready for trial.”171  
Accordingly, a represented party’s presence at a pretrial conference 
would only be needed to facilitate settlement.172  Judge Posner then 
discussed the dangers of an overly broad interpretation of an inherent 
                                                     
 161. Heileman, 871 F.2d at 650. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. at 651. 
 166. Id. at 652 (citation omitted). 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. at 656.  A similar approach to federal district court “inherent power” to order 
nonconsensual, nonbinding mediation was taken in In re Atlantic Pipe Corp., 304 F.3d 135, 145 (1st 
Cir. 2002). 
 169. Heileman, 871 F.2d at 661 (Coffey, J., dissenting). 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. (Posner, J., dissenting). 
 172. Id. 
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power to promote settlement.173  One danger involved encouraging 
“judicial high-handedness” because of the idea that “power corrupts.”174  
Also, because people hire attorneys to “economize on their own 
investment of time in resolving disputes,” there was a danger in 
overriding their judgment.175  However, Judge Posner also recognized 
that because “necessity breaks iron,” inherent authority is “a potentially 
useful tool for effecting settlement, even if there is some difficulty in 
finding a legal basis.”176  He recognized that trial judges face “heavy” 
workloads and was hesitant “to infer inadvertent prohibitions” by federal 
rulemakers of the powers that are necessary for the trial judges to 
function successfully.177  He did not further explore the contours of 
FRCP 16 as he found that, whatever it—or any inherent power—
permitted, the order against Joseph Oat was impermissible because Oat 
had made it clear that it would not agree to pay any money.178 
In his dissent, Judge Coffey was even more cautious about inherent 
power.  He was “convinced that Rule 16 does not authorize a trial judge 
to require a represented party litigant to attend a pretrial conference 
together with his or her attorney because the rule mandates in clear and 
unambiguous terms that only an unrepresented party litigant and 
attorneys may be ordered to appear.”179  While Judge Coffey agreed that 
judges do possess some degree of inherent authority, he believed “this 
authority is limited,” suggesting that more expansive trial court powers 
should be granted through federal judicial rulemaking.180  He outlined a 
“host of problems” that accompany an overly broad inherent power 
doctrine, including “a substantial invitation for judicial abuse” as well as 
the prospect of undermining the appearance of impartiality and causing 
                                                     
 173. Id. 
 174. Id.; see also In re NLO, Inc., 5 F.3d 154, 157–58 (6th Cir. 1993) (using this rationale to 
overturn a trial court order mandating participation in a summary jury trial, noting that the FRCP did 
not expressly permit it and proposals to expand trial court compulsory powers involving summary 
trials had been expressly rejected). 
 175. See Heileman, 871 F.3d at 657 (Posner, J., dissenting) (stating judges may “ignore the value 
of other people’s time” in their zeal to settle cases). 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. at 658 (discussing the lack of duty imposed by Rule 16 to engage in good faith 
bargaining and Joseph Oat’s refusal to accept monetary settlement).  But cf. Pitman v. Brinker Int’l, 
Inc., 216 F.R.D. 481, 486 (D. Ariz. 2003) (suggesting that even those who profess to be uninterested 
in settling can have their physical presence compelled because in “the give-and-take” of settlement 
talks, views of a case can be “altered”). 
 179. Heileman, 871 F.2d at 658 (Coffey, J., dissenting). 
 180. See id. at 658, 663 (“[I]f we wish to grant federal trial judges the power, let it be 
accomplished through the accepted channels of the Supreme Court.”). 
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confusion and dismay among litigants over judicial participation.181  
Finally, he said the majority opinion “upsets the delicate balance the 
Supreme Court and Congress struck between the needs for judicial 
efficiency and the rights of the individual litigant.”182 
Judge Ripple, in dissent, found “that the most enduring—and 
dangerous—impact” of the majority opinion was to upset the relationship 
between Congress and the Judiciary.183  Because the Rules Enabling 
Act184 was “designed to foster a uniform system of procedure throughout 
the federal system,” he said the Act “hardly contemplates” a broad, 
amorphous definition of inherent power.185  He concluded that 
“Congressional concern for uniformity of practice in the federal courts” 
would be undermined as each individual court might “march to its own 
drummer.”186 
In dissent, Judge Manion lamented “judicial high-handedness,” 
additional expense to litigants, and no “appearance of fairness.”187  He 
opined that inherent power cannot be “a license for federal courts to do 
whatever seems necessary to move a case along.”188  Rather, it should 
only be employed “to fill gaps left by statute or rule.”189  Thus, “where a 
statue or rule specifically addresses a particular area, it is inappropriate to 
invoke inherent power to exceed the bounds the statute or rule sets.”190 
The Heileman opinions show how written civil procedure guidelines 
reflecting a narrow vision of civil trial courts can result in confusion and 
disparity where certainty and equality are desirable.191  Imagine how the 
                                                     
 181. Id. at 661–62.  Recognizing such potential problems, another appellate court determined 
that some such exercises of inherent power (in that case, to order compulsory nonbinding mediation) 
should be accompanied “in advance” by judicially dictated “reasonable” limits (e.g., time and 
expense).  In re Atlantic Pipe Corp., 304 F.3d 135, 147 (1st Cir. 2002). 
 182. Heileman, 871 F.2d at 662–63. 
 183. Id. at 665 (Ripple, J., dissenting). 
 184. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2000). 
 185. Heileman, 871 F.2d at 665 (Ripple, J., dissenting). 
 186. Id. at 666.  Of course, nothing close to absolute uniformity is desirable, or even 
contemplated by Congress, as evidenced by its compelling individual district court civil justice 
expense and delay reduction plans covering matters such as compelled attendance at settlement 
conferences.  See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 473(b)(5) (2000) (“[A] requirement that, upon notice by the 
court, representatives of the parties with authority to bind them in settlement discussions be present 
or available by telephone during any settlement conference.”). 
 187. Heileman, 871 F.2d at 670 (Manion, J., dissenting). 
 188. Id. at 666. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Certainly, broader guidelines expressly covering all who are “legally interested” could arise 
under local court rules.  See, e.g., Mulligan v. Piczon, 739 A.2d 605, 610 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1999) 
(relying on a local court rule which says “the party or a person with full settlement authority shall 
accompany the attorney to the pretrial conference” (emphasis omitted)).  However, uniform local 
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opinion would have read if the court had not only compelled the 
attendance of the defendant’s insurer, but also of the plaintiff’s insurer.  
A situation like this would occur if the plaintiff’s insurer had 
compensated the plaintiff for injuries caused by the defendant and had a 
lien to recover such payments.192 
B. A New Vision in a New Model Judicial Code 
Judicial settlement guidelines should allow participation of all who 
are “legally interested,” as contemplated in the 1972 Code.193  These 
guidelines should also recognize that settlements may encompass matters 
factually related to the pending claims, even where only the pleaded 
claims may be tried on the merits.  Professor Chayes did not articulate 
this vision.  The 1924 Canons more clearly suggested the appropriateness 
of such guidelines than did the 1990 Code, with its commentary.  There 
are ways to remodel the traditional vision of trial court conduct.  A new 
vision should include not only all those with legal interests, but also all 
disputes that might become “matters under submission” under the 1972 
Code.194 
One way to a new vision of trial courts is through the inevitable 
state-by-state deliberations on the new ABA initiative regarding the 
Model Code of Judicial Conduct.  The study commission specifically 
invited comments in a few areas, including “what role judges should play 
in encouraging parties to settle” civil cases.195  Unfortunately, the 
                                                                                                                                  
rules are rare so that at least some uncertainty and disparity will continue even should local rules 
proliferate.  Local court rulemaking on federal district court authority to compel nonbinding forms of 
alternative dispute resolution, as well as the split in federal case precedents on such judicial 
authority, are discussed in Amy M. Pugh & Richard A. Bales, The Inherent Power of the Federal 
Courts to Compel Participation in Nonbinding Forms of Alternative Dispute Resolution, 42 DUQ. L. 
REV. 1, 7–10, 14–19 (2003).  The article also suggests amendments to the Alternative Dispute 
Resolution Act of 1998 and to FRCP 16 in order to codify the positive inherent power case 
precedents.  Id. at 24–25. 
 192. Of course, some eyes might behold in FRCP 16 what most others never see.  In Lockhart v. 
Patel, 115 F.R.D. 44 (E.D. Ky. 1987), the trial judge seemingly found the version of FRCP 16 
applied in Heileman to be clear as a bell.  See id. at 46 (declaring that the authority to order 
attendance of “insurers at settlement conferences . . . is so well established as to be beyond doubt” 
and suggesting there were few cases under the 1983 version of FRCP 16 “because the text of the 
Rule is so clear as to require little interpretation”). 
 193. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3A(4) (1972). 
 194. Id. at Canon 3A(5) cmt.  For a proposal to amend the Model Code of Judicial Conduct 
regarding judicial settlement activity in civil cases, see Honorable John C. Cratsley, Judicial Ethics 
and Judicial Settlement Practices: Time for Two Strangers to Meet, 21 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 
569, 594 (2006), which proposes a bar on any judge trying a case where earlier personal settlement 
facilitation activity occurred. 
 195. Judicial Code Commission Releases Draft Proposal to Amend Parts of Code, 20 
ABA/BNA LAW. MANUAL ON PROF. CONDUCT 262, 263 (2004). 
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commission failed to speak loudly on all those with legal interests in 
pending civil actions and on all matters relevant in pending civil actions, 
including new claims, with or without nonparties, that are factually 
related to pending claims.  Canon 2 of its December 2005 draft continues 
to speak of judicial duties as involving “Adjudication”196 and 
“Administration.”197  While the rules and comments at times speak to 
“matters assigned,”198 any person “who has a legal interest,”199 and 
“participants”200 in judicial proceedings, within the section on 
adjudication they focus more on the “rights of litigants,”201 ensuring the 
rights of the parties to be heard,202 the settlements of “parties,”203 how 
parties should not be coerced into settlement,204 ex parte communication 
barriers and procedures involving “parties,”205 separate conferencing 
“with the parties and their lawyers in an effort to settle matters 
pending,”206 “personal bias or prejudice concerning a party or a party’s 
lawyer,”207 a judge’s “economic interest . . . in a party to the 
proceeding,”208 campaign contributions by “a party” or “a party’s 
lawyer,”209 and a procedure whereby “parties” waive their concerns 
regarding judicial disqualifications.210 
Incidentally, the December 2005 draft of a new Model Code of 
Judicial Conduct also follows its predecessors by failing to make a clear 
distinction between adjudications of civil and criminal cases.  The 
applicable procedures are dramatically different.  In criminal cases, 
unpresented claims are not adjudicated, judges are not proactive in 
facilitating settlements, lawyers do not settle on behalf of their clients, 
and remedial and punitive orders are generally enforced outside of the 
trial courts. 
If the Model Code of Judicial Conduct and other ABA 
pronouncements like the Standards Relating to Trial Courts, the 
                                                     
 196. 2005 Draft, supra note 42, at Canons 2.05–12. 
 197. Id. at Canons 2.13–20. 
 198. Id. at Canon 2.05. 
 199. Id. at Canon 2.09(A). 
 200. Id. at Canon 2.10 cmt. 3. 
 201. Id. at Canon 2.05 cmt. 1. 
 202. Id. at Canon 2.09. 
 203. Id. at Canon 2.09 cmt. 2. 
 204. Id. at Canon 2.09(B). 
 205. Id. at Canon 2.10(A). 
 206. Id. at Canon 2.10(A)(3). 
 207. Id. at Canon 2.12(A)(1). 
 208. Id. at Canon 2.12(A)(3). 
 209. Id. at Canon 2.12(A)(4). 
 210. Id. at Canon 2.12(C). 
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descriptions of private civil case resolutions by academicians like 
Professor Chayes, and similar visions of American trial courts were all 
broadened to encompass those with legal interests and all matters that 
might be resolved amicably, if not tried, in civil cases, then it is more 
likely that written civil procedures laws, such as FRCP 16, would more 
comprehensively speak to civil case practices and would be a “more 
accurate reflection of actual practice.”211  Altering traditional 
perspectives would not be difficult.  The Model Code of Judicial 
Conduct could speak to civil case responsibilities generally in a section 
on civil case resolution rather than in sections on adjudication and 
administration.  Within this new section, at least three avenues of civil 
case resolution should be recognized: de novo, appellate review, and 
arbitration confirmation.  Within the de novo category, criminal cases 
and civil cases would be separated.  For civil cases subject to a de novo 
look, the major dispute resolution techniques should be separated, 
including pronouncements on adjudication on the merits (e.g., summary 
judgement, trial by jury, and bench trial), settlements, and resolutions not 
on the merits (e.g., dismissals on venue or jurisdiction grounds, for 
pleading deficiencies, or as sanctions for litigation misconduct). 
Within the settlement principles, distinctions should be drawn 
between wholly private settlements (no judicial involvement) and 
judicially facilitated settlements (e.g., via devices such as judicial 
settlement conferences, court-compelled arbitrations, and court-annexed 
mediations).  Distinctions should be drawn between the various judicial-
facilitation devices on questions like who may preside and whether only 
pleaded or otherwise presented claims may be considered.  Further 
distinctions seem better addressed in civil procedure laws rather than in 
the judicial conduct standards.  As well, distinctions should be drawn 
generally between settlements which may or may not prompt future 
same-case enforcement (e.g., where a settlement breach may be enforced 
in the very same case in which the settlement arose, thus obviating the 
need for a new civil action).  Again, civil procedure laws seemingly 
would better speak to more particular issues. 
Within the de novo principles involving adjudications on the merits, 
civil disputes might be distinguished between those involving only 
named parties, only pleaded or otherwise presented claims, or only 
nonparties (where some such disputes might only be settled, as they 
could never be tried on the merits).  Within the de novo principles 
involving resolutions not on the merits, discretionary versus mandatory 
                                                     
 211. FED. R. CIV. P. 16 advisory committee’s note, 97 F.R.D. 165, 207 (1983). 
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adjudicatory jurisdiction could generally be addressed, as well as full 
faith and credit/comity concerns. 
C. New Civil Case Settlement Guidelines 
With new visions of civil trial courts, new and more comprehensive 
written guidelines on civil case resolutions will be easier to promulgate.  
As to judicial settlement conferences in civil cases where there is some 
de novo authority over nonparties and unpleaded claims,212 the Heileman 
issue (who may be compelled to attend a judicial settlement conference) 
could be solved by a new rule or statute, modeled on—though different 
from—Michigan Court Rule 2.401(F).213  It could say: 
For a conference at which meaningful discussion of settlement is 
anticipated, the court may direct that persons with authority to settle the 
pending claims, as well as representatives of lienholders, 
representatives of insurers, and others who are financially interested in 
the outcome of pending and related claims (1) be present at the 
conference or (2) be immediately available by telephone or 
otherwise.214 
As to both judicial settlement conferences and private settlement 
talks, on the requisites for a valid settlement agreement when there is 
possible same-case settlement enforcement, a new rule or statute, 
modeled on Texas Civil Procedure Rule 11,215 could say: “No complete 
or partial settlement will be enforced unless it be in writing, signed, and 
allowed by the court to be filed, or unless it be made in open court and 
entered of record.”216  Such requirements would eliminate the problems 
that arise when agreements, reached orally at judicial settlement 
conferences, are never written or recorded in open court, but are subject 
                                                     
 212. But see Richard L. Marcus, Slouching Toward Discretion, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1561, 
1611 (2003) (“To say that there is too much procedural discretion . . . leaves open the question of 
alternatives.  Regarding case management . . . the critics have not offered many attractive options.  
Indeed, some seem to concede that the systemic changes that have led to the current situation do not 
admit of ready cures.”). 
 213. MICH. CT. R. 2.401. 
 214. Id.  Interestingly, some local court rules on civil claim settlement facilitation speak a lot 
more about settlement devices than about judicial settlement conferences.  See, e.g., W.D. MICH. 
CIV. R. 16 (speaking at greater length of the alternative dispute resolution methods involving 
voluntary facilitative mediation, early neutral evaluation, case evaluation, and court-annexed 
arbitration than of settlement conferences—though for the latter the role of an insurer is at least 
recognized).  All court-sponsored settlement devices merit at least some guidance from written laws 
as they all can present difficult issues involving uniform practices. 
 215. TEX. R. CIV. P. 11. 
 216. Id. 
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to same-case enforcement.  Here, the trial judges—unfortunately—
become witnesses in the hearings over which they preside.  While 
finding such an agreement potentially “enforceable,” Judge Richard 
Posner opined, in Lynch, Inc. v. SamataMason Inc.,217 that reliance on 
the  trial judge’s memory of settlement details is a troublesome way to 
establish settlement terms because “memory is fallible” and “trial judges 
have a natural desire to see cases settled and off their docket.”218  A 
recording of the settlement by a court reporter, he said, would have 
provided a “solid, indeed an unimpeachable, basis” for establishing the 
agreement and constitutes “standard practice” that “should be followed 
in all cases.”219 
In addressing when a trial court can enforce a settlement in the same 
civil case in which it arose, a California statute could also be used as a 
model.  Following California Civil Procedure Code 664.6, a same-case 
judicial enforcement rule or statute could say: 
If parties [or others legally interested in] pending litigation stipulate, in 
a writing signed . . . outside the presence of the court or orally before 
the court, for settlement of the case, or part thereof, the court, upon 
motion, may enter judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement.  If 
requested . . . the court may retain jurisdiction . . . to enforce the 
settlement until performance in full of the terms of the settlement. 220 
In the federal district courts, where such enforcement typically would fall 
within the discretionary powers of the supplemental jurisdiction 
statute,221 a new statute or rule could also reflect guidelines on when and 
                                                     
 217. 279 F.3d 487 (7th Cir. 2002) (employing Illinois contract law).  A review of choice of law 
analyses for issues involving settlement contracts appears in Jeffrey A. Parness & Matthew R. 
Walker, Enforcing Settlements in Federal Civil Actions, 36 IND. L. REV. 33, 47–49 (2003). 
 218. Lynch, 279 F.3d at 490. 
 219. Id. at 490–91.  An earlier call for such a practice is found in Jeffrey A. Parness & Austin W. 
Bartlett, The Authority of Illinois Lawyers to Settle Their Clients’ Civil Claims: On Principles Not 
Quite Settled, 31 LOY. U. CHI. L. J. 199, 224 (2000).  Cf. Ross v. Mavrakis, 799 N.E.2d 469, 478 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 2003) (trusting the trial judges to resolve disputes over whether agreements were reached 
and over their terms when there are no transcripts or written court orders on what was said at 
judicially managed settlement conferences). 
 220. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 664.6 (West Supp. 2006). 
 221. Of course, there may be no enforcement discretion where a settlement contemplates same-
case judicial enforcement when only certain remedies are sought; here, the complainant may have 
discretion to pursue the limited remedies in the trial court where the settlement occurred or to pursue 
all remedies in a new trial court case.  See, e.g., Paulucci v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 842 So. 2d 797, 
803 (Fla. 2003) (continuing jurisdiction to enforce can be “circumscribed by the terms” of the 
settlement).  Thus, some complainants can seek settlement enforcement in the same trial courts if 
they seek compliance with settlement terms, but will need to initiate new cases where they urge the 
contracts are no longer valid (due to “material” breaches) or where they “seek general damages not 
specified” in the settlement agreements.  Id. 
PARNESS FINAL.DOC 1/12/2007  2:58:09 PM 
218 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55 
how these discretionary powers might be exercised.  There should be 
greater opportunities in federal courts for trial judges to agree to enforce 
settlements of pleaded claims involving named parties than settlements 
involving nonparties and state law claims.  A new law could also reflect 
the mechanics of how a trial judge retains enforcement jurisdiction, as 
there has been confusion in the lower-level federal courts over the 
techniques available.222  The foregoing illustrates only some of the 
possible new general civil procedure laws223 on settlements that could 
follow a new vision of civil trial courts.224 
With a new vision of civil trial courts, additional guidelines might 
also be more easily pursued for nonsettlement issues involving 
nonparties and unpleaded claims over which there is currently some 
confusion.225  For example, there is uncertainty concerning the type of 
hearing necessary when a plaintiff’s insurer seeks to press a lien (arising 
from paid medical bills for example) against the monetary settlement 
recovered by the plaintiff in a tort case.  A good example comes from 
Indiana where there is a lien reduction statute lacking detailed 
procedures.226  As one state appeals court lamented: 
The main problem in this case is the confusion on the part of both 
parties and the trial court as to what should have transpired at the 
November 18 hearing.  We observe that this is likely because neither 
the Lien Reduction Statute itself nor case law interpreting it provide 
guidance as to how a proceeding to reduce a lien should be initiated and 
conducted.  This lack of guidance left everyone unclear as to what 
                                                     
 222. See Parness & Walker, supra note 217, at 40–43 (discussing the retention of settlement 
enforcement jurisdiction).  In retaining same-case enforcement jurisdiction in a rare case of de novo 
authority, the Supreme Court said in Alaska v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 1014, 1016 (2006): “The 
Court retains jurisdiction to entertain such further proceedings, enter such orders, and issue such 
writs as from time to time may be deemed necessary or advisable to effectuate and supplement this 
Decree and the rights of the respective parties.  In all other respects, this Decree is final.” 
 223. Other new general civil procedure or professional responsibility laws on settlements of 
pending civil cases could address such matters as settlements under seal, attorney civil claim 
settlement authority, and discretion to refuse to exercise enforcement jurisdiction when asked 
although it was earlier retained. 
 224. In the absence of written general norms, individual courts or individual judges have 
authority to develop special local norms through local rules (or standing orders, perhaps).  See, e.g., 
CAL. 4TH DIST. CT. APP. DIVISION ONE R. 4 (stating local rule for appellate level civil settlement 
conference procedures); CAL. 4TH DIST. CT. APP. DIVISION ONE INTERNAL OPERATING PROCEDURE 
IX (stating local rule for appellate level settlement conferences that are court initiated); ILL. 16TH J. 
CIR. R. 10.01 (pertaining to trial level civil case settlements on behalf of minors, wards, and disabled 
persons). 
 225. Even when there are written guidelines, they can be confusing.  See, e.g., 770 ILL. COMP. 
STAT. ANN. 5/1 (West 2006) (recognizing an attorney’s lien on the civil claims of a client, allowing 
an attorney to seek enforcement in a related civil case after serving notice in writing to the “adverse 
party,” and permitting the trial court to “adjudicate the rights of the parties” (emphasis added)). 
 226. See IND. CODE § 34-51-2-19 (1998) (lacking such procedures). 
PARNESS FINAL.DOC 1/12/2007  2:58:09 PM 
2006] AMERICAN GENERAL JURISDICTION TRIAL COURTS 219 
should have taken place at the . . . hearing.  There seems to have been 
no consensus as to whether an evidentiary hearing with live testimony 
was required or whether affidavits, documentary evidence, and 
argument of counsel would suffice to resolve Needler’s motion.  
Indeed, it appears based on what we can glean from the limited case 
law that motions or petitions to adjudicate liens under the Lien 
Reduction Statute have, at least in some cases, been resolved solely on 
the basis of documentary evidence and argument of counsel and not 
pursuant to a full evidentiary hearing.  It also appears that proceedings 
to reduce a lien often take the form of a declaratory judgment action, as 
the trial court thought would be appropriate, but sometimes they appear 
to have been litigated through a motion ancillary to the underlying 
lawsuit, as Needler initiated this action.227 
As to a defendant’s insurer, there seems to be some uncertainty 
regarding the standards for notification of that insurer so that a plaintiff 
may recover later on a judgment entered against a defendant/insured.228  
Proper regard for nonparty interests and their participation opportunities 
in civil actions would be enhanced with a new written norm that said at 
the outset of a case, or at least by the time of serious settlement talks, that 
trial judges and adversaries should be informed as to “all persons, 
associations of persons, firms, partnerships, corporations, guarantors, 
insurers, affiliates, parent or subsidiary corporations, or other legal 
entities who or which are financially interested in the outcome of the 
case.”229 
D. New Trial Court Guidelines for Reviewing Private Arbitrations and 
Agency Adjudications 
With a new vision of civil trial courts, it should also be easier to 
formulate better written guidelines for trial-court review of private 
arbitrations and agency adjudications.  These guidelines would 
supplement existing statutory provisions, as in federal and state 
arbitration and administrative procedure acts. 
Concerning private arbitrations, the general guidelines on 
confirmation procedures typically should be comparable for arbitrations 
                                                     
 227. Principal Life Ins. Co. v. Needler, 816 N.E.2d 499, 503–04 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (citation 
omitted); cf. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:13-5 (West 2000) (stating when an attorney’s lien is erected and 
how an attorney petitions the court to determine and enforce a lien), noted in Levine v. Levine, 884 
A.2d 222, 226–29 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005). 
 228. See, e.g., Vega v. Gore, 730 N.E.2d 587, 590 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000) (distinguishing between 
inadequate notice of the occurrence prompting a lawsuit and notice of the lawsuit in a timely way). 
 229. N.D. TEX. LOC. R. 3.1(f), 7.4 (stating that affirmative and responsive pleadings must 
include this information, although the primary purpose seems to be to ensure judicial independence). 
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under general federal and state arbitration acts as the proarbitration 
policies are substantially similar.230  While general statutes or court rules 
on proceedings to compel arbitration or to confirm an arbitration award 
are not plentiful, there are some existing laws that could serve as models 
in areas of uncertainty.231  For example, there is some “alarm” over 
federal courts that too easily vacate arbitration awards232 as well as some 
confusion about whether the FAA has a one-year statute of limitations 
for judicial confirmation proceedings.233  On vacating arbitration awards, 
Iowa provisions seemingly speak more precisely than the FAA.234  On 
timing, New York provisions seem clearer.235  Moreover, there is 
unfortunately much confusion in the use of the term “arbitration 
agreement,” rather than the more precise term “arbitration clause,” in 
articulating judicial and arbitrator rules.236 
                                                     
 230. These acts are similar as most state laws are modeled on the Uniform Arbitration Act 
(UAA), which itself generally follows the FAA.  But see Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 
U.S. 265, 269 (1995) (noting the Supreme Court of Alabama has held that the FAA preempted an 
Alabama statute that made written predispute arbitration agreements invalid in Alabama under ALA. 
CODE § 8-1-41(3) (1989)). 
 231. Besides the general state laws noted below, there are also special arbitration laws.  See, e.g., 
PA. R. CIV. P. 1326–1331 (stating procedure to compel arbitration and confirm an arbitration award 
in a consumer credit transaction). 
 232. See Pamela A. MacLean, Vacated Arbitration Awards Brings Alarm, NAT’L L.J., Feb. 6, 
2006, at 4 (reporting on and examining Michigan Family Resources, Inc. v. Service Employees 
International Union Local 517M, 438 F.3d 653, 661–63 (6th Cir. 2006) (Sutton, J., concurring), 
which opined that the circuit court approach “has made it easier to vacate an arbitration award on the 
merits than the Supreme Court meant it to be” and calling for full circuit court review)); see also 
B.L. Harbert Int’l, L.L.C. v. Hercules Steel Co., 441 F.3d 905, 914 (11th Cir. 2006) (expressing 
exasperation at “those who would attempt to salvage arbitration losses through litigation that has no 
sound basis in the law”); Stephen L. Hayford, Law in Disarray: Judicial Standards for Vacatur of 
Commercial Arbitration Awards, 30 GA. L. REV. 731, 734–98 (1996) (examining the willingness of 
courts to vacate arbitration awards); Paul F. Kirgis, The Contractarian Model of Arbitration and Its 
Implications for Judicial Review of Arbitral Awards 17 (St. John’s Univ. Sch. of Law Legal Studies 
Research Paper Series, Paper No. 06-0037, 2006), available at http://SSRN.com/abstract=877171 
(discussing how courts find grounds for overturning awards). 
 233. MBNA Am. Bank, N.A. v. Rogers, 835 N.E.2d 219, 221–22 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (finding 
no Supreme Court or Seventh Circuit precedents, though the Second Circuit had ruled that the FAA 
created a one-year statute of limitations). 
 234. IOWA CODE ANN. § 679A.12 (West 1998 & Supp. 2006); see also B.L. Harbert, 441 F.3d at 
910–13 (recognizing that in addition to the four statutory grounds in the FAA for judicial vacatur of 
arbitration awards, “there are three non-statutory grounds,” where, one, manifest disregard of the 
law, was unfortunately confusing to one of the parties due to “speculative dicta” in an earlier 
precedent). 
 235. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 7502(a)(iv) (McKinney 2006) (confirming arbitration award). 
 236. See, e.g., Higgins v. Superior Court, 45 Cal. Rptr. 3d 293, 303 (Ct. App. 2006) 
(“Uncertainty can become especially pronounced when parties or courts use the term ‘arbitration 
agreement,’ when ‘arbitration clause’ might be more precise.”); see also Fox Int’l Relations v. 
FISERV Secs., 418 F. Supp. 2d 718, 724 (E.D. Pa. 2006) (stating that while it “may seem 
paradoxical,” a court may “enforce an arbitration agreement in a contract that the arbitrator later 
finds to be void” and a court “may deny effect to an arbitration provision in a contract that the court 
later finds to be perfectly enforceable”). 
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In February 2006, the Eleventh Circuit, while recognizing some 
confusion over the nonstatutory grounds for vacating FAA-guided 
arbitrations,237 suggested there also be consideration of new, preferably 
written, guidelines on sanctioning those frivolously opposing final 
arbitration awards.  Specifically, it said: 
 Courts cannot prevent parties from trying to convert arbitration 
losses into court victories, but it may be that we can and should insist 
that if a party on the short end of an arbitration award attacks that 
award in court without any real legal basis for doing so, that party 
should pay sanctions.  A realistic threat of sanctions may discourage 
baseless litigation over arbitration awards and help fulfill the purposes 
of the pro-arbitration policy contained in the FAA.  It is an idea worth 
considering.238 
It proceeded to declare itself “ready, willing, and able to consider 
imposing sanctions in appropriate cases,” having issued a “notice and 
warning.”239  As with defenses in certain de novo civil actions, there may 
be an empirical, or other public policy, basis for treating specially, and 
with greater wariness, objections to certain arbitration confirmation 
proceedings. 
In settings where there are superseding arbitration statutes,240 as with 
health care241 and employment,242 special statutes or court rules on 
sanctioning those opposing arbitration confirmations may also be in 
order where the superseding statutes are silent.  Again, while there are 
not special statutes or court rules at every turn, there are a few 
illustrations.  For example, effective February 1, 2006, Pennsylvania has 
adopted new written court rules on compelling arbitration and 
confirming arbitration awards in consumer credit transactions.243 
                                                     
 237. B.L. Harbert, 441 F.3d at 914 (acknowledging “speculative dicta” providing appellant with 
“a little cover” to justify its appeal of the arbitration ruling). 
 238. Id. at 913–14. 
 239. Id. at 914. 
 240. Superseding statutes may exempt from general arbitration act provisions several differing 
types of arbitration pacts at once.  See, e.g., TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 171.002(a)(1), 
(3)–(4) (Vernon 2005) (making general arbitration act inapplicable to employer/labor union pacts, 
typical claims for personal injury, and claims for workers’ compensation benefits). 
 241. See, e.g., 710 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 15/1-14 (West 1999) (health care arbitration 
agreements). 
 242. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 251, § 1 (West 2004) (addressing inapplicability of 
UAA to “collective bargaining agreements to arbitrate”). 
 243. PA. R. CIV. P. 1326–1331.  The Civil Procedure Rules Committee’s explanatory comment 
indicates that the new rules should “minimize court involvement and provide quicker and cheaper 
relief to the litigants.”  PA. R. CIV. P. 1326 cmt.  It also recognizes that “procedures that work for 
consumer credit transactions may not work for all types of matters involving statutory [UAA] and 
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Concerning agency adjudications, general guidelines on trial court 
review procedures should be substantially similar and typically included 
within general administrative procedure laws.244  Unlike original subject 
matter jurisdiction over “civil actions”245 or “justiciable matters,”246 
appellate, or appellate-type, review authority of general trial courts over 
administrative agency adjudications, and other administrative agency 
“action,”247 is usually guided by legislation.248  Yet where the enabling 
legislation for general trial court review of certain administrative agency 
actions contains unique provisions (e.g., greater judicial deference than 
usual to a particular agency’s actions on legal issues due to that agency’s 
very special experience or expertise), then special statutory review 
procedures may be needed.249 
Re-envisioning American trial courts so they are perceived as 
significant overseers of administrative agency actions could facilitate 
new written guidelines in areas of current uncertainty.  For example, 
there are now “muddled” judicial analyses regarding the level of federal 
court deference due a federal agency’s interpretation of the statutes it 
administers.250  An administrative procedure act could be amended to 
clarify the circumstances under which agency interpretations carry the 
“force of law” to which courts must defer.251  Amendments could speak 
                                                                                                                                  
common law arbitration.”  Id. 
 244. See, e.g., 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/1-101, /3-102 (West 2003) (“Administrative 
Review Law,” guiding many judicial reviews of final agency decisions, is situated within the “Code 
of Civil Procedure”). 
 245. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. art. VI, § 6.04 (“Circuit court” has jurisdiction “in all cases except 
as may otherwise be provided by law”); CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 10 (“Superior courts” have 
jurisdiction over “causes”); COLO. CONST. art. VI, § 9 (district courts have “original jurisdiction in 
all civil, probate, and criminal cases”); D.C. CONST. art. IV, § 3(A) (“Superior Court shall have 
jurisdiction of civil actions or other matters, at law or in equity, brought in the State . . . .”). 
 246. See, e.g., ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 9 (circuit courts have original jurisdiction over “all 
justiciable matters”); KY. CONST. § 112(5) (circuit court has “original jurisdiction of all justiciable 
causes”). 
 247. See, e.g., ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 9 (circuit courts may be delegated power to review 
“administrative action”). 
 248. See, e.g., FLA. CONST. art. V, § 5(b) (circuit courts have power to review “administrative 
action”); ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 9 (circuit courts “shall have . . . power to review administrative 
action as provided by law”).  Of course, some final agency actions may be reviewable, in the first 
instance, in intermediate appellate courts.  See, e.g., ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 6 (“The Appellate Court 
shall have such powers of direct review of administrative action as provided by law.”); 5 ILL. COMP. 
STAT. ANN. 315/11(g) (2005) (allowing Appellate Court review of final unfair labor practice orders 
of the Local Labor Relations Board). 
 249. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 77-618 (1997) (judicial review of agency factfinding differs, 
e.g., for workers’ compensation, employment discrimination, and driver’s license termination 
proceedings than for other agency proceedings). 
 250. Lisa Schultz Bressman, How Mead Has Muddled Judicial Review of Agency Action, 58 
VAND. L. REV. 1443, 1475 (2005). 
 251. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 232 (2001) (stating that the general 
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to the particular agency lawmaking techniques that warrant even more 
deference (e.g., anything done procedurally beyond notice-and-comment 
rulemaking or bare bones informal adjudication).  Amendments could 
also speak more generally to the attributes of lawmaking procedures that 
must be considered in determining whether greater deference is 
warranted.252 
As well, new written guidelines could be contemplated for the 
standards of federal judicial review applicable to agency determinations 
of factual issues during adjudications.  For example, the federal 
Administrative Procedure Act provides, in its “scope of review” section, 
that an agency action not determined on the record be set aside if 
“arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in 
accordance with law,”253 while an agency action determined on the 
record be set aside if “unsupported by substantial evidence.”254  While 
the congressional language seemingly suggests differing levels of 
scrutiny, many federal judges find “the substantial evidence test and the 
arbitrary or capricious test are one and the same.”255  Could new written 
norms help overcome the confusion? 
Though there is good reason for state trial courts to operate like 
federal trial courts when reviewing final agency actions,256 very different 
standards should sometimes apply.  The comparable Illinois “scope of 
review” statute simply says that during judicial review of “any final 
administrative decision,” the “findings and conclusions of the 
administrative agency on questions of fact shall be held to be prima facie 
true and correct.”257  While Illinois courts often use the federal court 
approach on deference to agency legal analysis,258 on agency factfinding, 
Illinois precedents vary, speaking at times of a “manifest weight of the 
                                                                                                                                  
rulemaking power authorizes regulation with “force of law”). 
 252. See Bressman, supra note 250, at 1444–50 (discussing judicial deference to administrative 
agency rulemaking and adjudication). 
 253. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2000). 
 254. Id. § 706(2)(E). 
 255. See, e.g., Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Bd. of Governors, 745 F.2d 677, 683 
(D.C. Cir. 1984) (opinion by then-Circuit Judge Scalia). 
 256. Of course, no comparability should necessarily follow where similar agency actions (e.g., 
rules) originate from very different procedures (e.g., in some states there are no distinctions between 
formal and informal (on and off the record) agency rulemaking). 
 257. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/3-110 (West 2003).  Incidentally, such a decision does not 
encompass general rulemaking or regulations concerning internal management that do not affect 
private rights.  Id. at 5/3-101. 
 258. See, e.g., Church v. State, 646 N.E.2d 572, 577 (Ill. 1995) (stating that a state court will not 
substitute its own construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation adopted by the 
agency charged with the statute’s administration). 
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evidence” test259 and at times of a “substantial evidence” test.260  Re-
envisioning American trial courts might help focus civil procedure 
lawmakers so that they clarify uncertain guidelines on judicial review of 
final administrative actions. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Today American trial courts are trying less, and managing more, 
private civil cases.  They are also losing such cases to other dispute 
resolvers.  The traditional role of the trial judge as chiefly a neutral, 
detached, and passive adjudicator for private civil cases has given way to 
the trial judge who is a more active case manager, a more aggressive 
settlement facilitator, and an appellate-type reviewer of case decisions 
made elsewhere.  Unfortunately, contemporary-written civil procedure 
laws do not reflect this new vision.  They increasingly reflect legend 
rather than reality.  New general perspectives on contemporary trial court 
decisionmaking would help civil procedure lawmakers better formulate 
written procedural law guidelines for trial courts.  In particular, there is a 
need for new written laws on trial court settlements as well as on trial 
court oversight of earlier private arbitrations and administrative agency 
actions. 
 
                                                     
 259. See, e.g., Kloss v. Bd. of Fire & Police Comm’rs, 449 N.E.2d 845, 848 (Ill. 1983) 
(indicating that review of an administrative proceeding initially requires an inquiry into whether the 
administrative agency’s findings of fact are contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence); 
Basketfield v. Police Bd., 307 N.E.2d 371, 375 (Ill. 1974) (specifically rejecting substantial evidence 
test). 
 260. City of Burbank v. Ill. State Labor Relations Bd., 538 N.E.2d 1146, 1150 (Ill. 1989), 
superseded by statute, Illinois Public Labor Relations Act, 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 315/11(e) (West 
2005). 
